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I. INTRODUCTION

Changes in the world marketplace within the last decade have
led many to the inevitable conclusion that we are evolving toward a
global economy. One which is no longer confined to the borders of a
single country or territory, but which in fact transcends them. Even if
the above stated proposition is taken as uncontroverted, the effects of
such a world economy on the United States, and the role that the
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United States should play in it, are the subject of much controversy.
The debate over how the United States should prepare to participate in this global economy has intensified recently with the proposal
of a North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") between the
United States, Canada and Mexico.'
The debate over the benefits, or lack thereof, of the NAFTA is
not limited to arguments between pure protectionists on the one hand
and pure capitalists on the other. Since the resolution of this debate
could affect the livelihood of millions of United States workers, it has
evoked the emotional and often well thought out reactions of parties
occupying the middle ground as well. Organized labor in the United
States (hereinafter referred to as Labor) takes a position occupying
this middle ground.
Labor is opposed to any agreement, such as the NAFTA under
consideration at this time, which is not in the best interests of the
United States as a nation and its labor force.! The opposition by Labor to the present draft of the NAFTA is not a product of protectionist sentiment among Labor in the United States, but rather is a carefully orchestrated response to a proposed free trade agreement which,
if left unamended, serves merely as a tool for the exploitation of
those workers covered by the agreement, American, Mexican and
Canadian alike.'
Many of the arguments of both opponents and proponents of the
proposed NAFTA are complex, relying on intricate economic theories
for support, and are highly speculative in light of the relative dearth

1. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 62 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT] (GATT defines an FTA as
an agreement under which signatories remove tariffs and "other restrictive regulations on commerce . . . on substantially all the trade" between themselves); see also THE LIKELY IMPACT
ON THE UNITED STATES OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO, USITC pub. 2353,
Inv. No. 332-297, at xix n.10 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter "USITC 2353"] (An FTA is a form of
preferential trade liberalization in which two or more nations within the world trading community eliminate or substantially reduce barriers to trade among themselves). For an in depth
summary and analysis of the proposed North American Free Trade agreement see POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREETRADE AGREEMENT, USITC pub. 2596, Inv. No. 332-337 (Jan. 1993) (addressing "key provisions" and their potential impact); ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FTA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFrA WITH CANADA AND MEXICO, USITC pub.
2516, Inv. No. 332-317 (May 1992); ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FTA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFTA wrH CANADA AND MEXICO, USITC pub.

2508, Inv. No. 332-317 (May 1992) (addendum to the original report).
2. See infra notes 11845 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss2/1

2

Cunningham and Mercado-LIorens: The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industr
1993]

NAFTA: The Sale of U.S. Industry

of data upon which to base decisions.4 For this reason, Labor prefers
not to rely on speculative economic theories, but on the lessons of
recent history The conclusions are unavoidable.6
To deal in terms of "net results", as supporters of the NAFTA
do, is to ignore the real results to those who will be adversely affected.7 Supporters claim, without further explanation, that the NAFTA
will be an engine which drives the American economy to create high
skilled, high wage jobs.8 In addition, they claim that the workers of
those industries or sectors impacted negatively by the agreement can
be mobilized to fill the needs created by those sectors which are the
beneficiaries of the agreement.'
In the face of the economic reality of the 1990's, slow economic
growth and the contraction of the American manufacturing sector,
Labor questions how the retraining of displaced workers will occur,
and exactly how the high wage, high skill jobs will materialize." In
addition, judging by the effects of the Maquiladora program," the
United States economy will not reap the benefits of increased employment in high skill jobs, but rather will be devastated further by the
flight of much needed capital to Mexico and the further depression of
American wages and working conditions.' 2
H. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AMERICAN

WORKING FAMILY
Before one considers the effects that the NAFTA will have on
the American economy, it is helpful to examine the present economic
backdrop. The lives of those affected by the NAFTA are not theoretical, mere numbers plugged into an economic formula, they are real. 3
As then-Governor Clinton stated in a campaign speech, "As we move

4. See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text discussing the economic theories.
5. See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text discussing recent history.
6. See infra notes 118-145 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
10. See supra notes 8 and 9.
11. "Maquiladora" is roughly translated as a Mexican "inbond" industry. It was established in 1965 to attract foreign manufacturing operations. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 1-5.
12. See infra notes 115-62 and accompanying text.
13. The burden borne by the workers of this country today, how the burden has increased due to certain recent practices, and how the NAFTA will affect the burden in the
future are all relevant considerations when considering the propriety of the NAFTA; see also
infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
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toward free trade, we must always remember why we're doing it to help the working men and women of America."14 As a general
barometer of whether any NAFrA is acceptable one must ask the
question, "does it help the working men and women of America?""5
The effects of recent United States trade policy, most notably the
Maquiladora programs with Mexico, 6 on the lives of American
workers have been harsh. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
manufacturing jobs decreased from 21 million to 19 million during
the decade of the 1980s." As a result, unemployed manufacturing
workers were forced to find other jobs. Unfortunately, when they did,
they were forced to take a 10% pay cut in their real earnings." A
significant number of other workers failed to find a job for five years
after their initial displacement. 9 Approximately one-half were unsuccessful in their job search after dislocation and left the labor force
entirely.Consider for example, the experience of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"), which, with over 900,000
members, is one of the largest member unions of the AFL-CIO and
one of the largest labor unions in North America." It has had a net
loss of over 30,000 United States jobs in the manufacturing sector
since 1985.' Of this number, 25,000 of the job losses have been to
Mexico and the Maquiladora factories.' The story has been similar
for other AFL-CIO member unions, both large and small. 4

14. The 1992 Campaign; In Their Own Words, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at A18
inafter "Clinton"].
15. NAFTA: Environment and Labor Agreements: Hearings Before a Joint Meeting
Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment and the Subconn. on Western
sphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993)
mony of Segundo Mercado-Llorens, Director of Government Affairs, United Food and
mercial Workers International Union) [hereinafter Mercado-Liorens], quoting Clinton,
note 14.
16. See infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
17.

[hereof the
Hemi(testiComsupra

See generally MICHAEL PODGURSKY, JOB DISPLACEMENT AND THE RURAL WORKER

(Economic Policy Institute 1991).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HEARINGS ON THE DESIRABILITY, THE
SCOPE AND THE EFFECTS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1991) (testimo-

ny of Robert Wood, Director Research and Economics Department, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers) [hereinafter IBEW]; see also Appendix A, "IBEW Job Losses To
Mexico."
22. IBEW, supra note 21, at 18.
23. Id.
24. See North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings before the U.S. Government
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While it is getting hard to find a job after displacement, it is
also becoming increasingly difficult to make ends meet even if one or
both spouses are employed. In his book, Head To Head, economist
Lester Thurow claims that during the period from 1978 to 1988 the
American economy created 7.5 million new male jobs.' However,
after adjustments for inflation, 18.4 million males had 1988 earnings
below 1978 levels.'s Most of the jobs created, therefore can be considered below average jobs and another 10.9 million males accepted
jobs with real wage reductions. 7 The result was that median male
wages fell during the 1980's by nine percent in real terms.'
As for the female workforce, it was increased female participation during the 1980's that created the slow rise in median family
incomes, despite falling male wages. 9 However, since most women
already participate in the workforce, this resource will not be available to offset any the further deterioration of real wages during the
1990's."
Manufacturing wages among American workers have also declined in relation to our competitors around the world."1 At the beginning of this decade U.S. workers were ranked fifteenth in manufacturing wages 2 American manufacturing wages are a full nine dollars
per hour behind our West German counterparts, and more if fringe
benefits are included in the calculations.33 Most importantly, the
wage differential and decline in world rankings was not only due to
wage increases among our competitors, but also to a five percent
decline, after adjustments for inflation, in manufacturing wages among

Interagency Panel on the North American Free Trade Agreement (1991) (testimony of Philip
Mamber, President District 2, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
(UE)) (lob cuts by General Electric from 1700 to 450 after opening a factory in Juarez,
Mexico); see also Hearings Regarding A U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement before the United States Trade Representative (1991) (testimony of William H. Wynn, International President,
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union) (Green Giant moved its broccoli
and cauliflower processing plant from Watsonville, California to Irapuato, Mexico. The move
displaced 380 American workers, while employing Mexican workers at a rate of $4 dollars a
day.).
25. LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG
JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERICA 163 (1992).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 164.
Id.
Labor Costs In Manufacturing, THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 99.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. workers during the 1980's.'
It is in the face of these figures, which starkly illustrate struggles
of recently dislocated workers, that the NAFTA emerges with the
promise that dislocated workers will be retrained and absorbed into
"other" sectors of the United States economy.'
Are the fears of the workers of America misplaced, myopic,
selfish? When even the proponents of the NAFTA agree that the
agreement will result in the loss of jobs, it can confidently be said
that the fears of Labor are justified.'
I. THE IMPETUS TO INCLUDE MEXICO
The possibility of a free trade agreement between these unlikely
partners has evolved from a distant goal to a serious possibility in a
relatively short time. 7 The evolution culminated on June 10, 1990,
when President Bush and Mexican President Salinas de Gortari endorsed a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") as
the best means to strengthen economic relations and meet the challenges of international competition." Subsequently, Canada requested
participation in the negotiations.39
On September 25, 1990, then President Bush formally requested
Congress to allow the use of the so-called "fast-track" procedure for
negotiating an FTA with Mexico and to explore the possibilities of
Canada joining an agreement.' Congress has approved the use of the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
USITC 2353, supra note 1, at vii.
See Mexico-United States Joint Statement on Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement,

PUB. PAPERS 806-07 (June 11, 1990).
Presidents Bush and Salinas have endorsed negotiation of an FTA that involves "the gradual and comprehensive elimination of trade barriers between the
two countries, including: the full, phased elimination of import tariffs; the elimination or fullest possible reduction of non-tariff trade barriers, such as import quotas,
licenses, and technical barriers to trade; the establishment of clear, binding protection for intellectual property rights; fair and expeditious dispute settlement procedures; and means to improve and expand the flow of goods, services, and investment between the United States and Mexico.
Id.
39. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at xix (Canada requested participation in the negotiations with a view to negotiating a North American FTA.).
40. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Mexico-United States Free Trade Negotiations,
PUB. PAPERS. 1292-93 (Sept. 25, 1990); see also, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2903 (1988) (The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 in which the "fast track" procedures are set
forth).
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"fast-track" procedure and the negotiations have since been expanded
to include Canada. '
The impetus for Mexico to enter into an FTA with the United
States is clear. The United States represents a potentially unlimited
market for Mexico's rapidly growing economy with its abundance of
cheap labor."
Theoretically, the impetus for this endorsement of the NAFTA,
from the perspective of the United States, was the recent and almost
radical change in Mexico's economic policy.43 Less than 5 years ago,
Mexico was "mired in debt and committed to a highly interventionist
economic policy that discouraged imports and limited foreign participation in the Mexican economy.""
Until the mid-1980s, Mexican economic policies were aimed at a
high degree of self-sufficiency and involved substantial state intervention.45 "For decades, Mexico, like many Latin American countries,
relied on import substitution policies, restrictions on foreign investment, and a controlled exchange rate in attempting to foster domestic
growth and avoid the perceived danger of foreign domination."'
In recent years, however, Mexico has reduced state intervention
in the economy and opened its market to foreign goods, services, and
investment. 7 Largely as a result of these events, two-way trade be-

41. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2903 (1988). Once the President gives notice to the House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee that negotiations of a treaty
are in progress, such "fast track" provisions are applicable as long as neither committee votes
to withdraw the authority within 60 days of such notice. The "fast track" allows the President to negotiate the treaty and present it to Congress which then has 90 legislative days to
accept or reject the treaty, but may not amend it. Id.
42. See infra notes 143 and 144 and accompanying text.
43. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at vii.
44. Id.
45. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 1-1 n.1. ("The Constitution of 1917 assigns to
the government a dominant role in managing and regulating the economy" (citations omitted)).
46. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 1-1 ("Mexico's economy also featured a strong
"parastatal" sector, which consisted of entities owned or controlled by the state. The number
of such entities increased from 391 in 1970 to 1,155 in 1982. The parastatal sector included
the petroleum industry, which generated 75% of Mexico's foreign exchange revenues in
1983.").
47. Id at 1-2.
Import licenses, previously required on all Mexican imports, are now required on only 230 products of the nearly 12,000 items in the Mexican tariff schedule. Mexico abolished numerous other nontariff barriers, including its "official import prices," an arbitrary customs valuation system that raised duty assessments.
The Mexican practice of heavily subsidizing exports is being phased out. In addition, Mexico's commitment to improve intellectual property rights protection led the
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tween the United States and Mexico has grown significantly.4"
However, remnants of the historically oppressive government
apparatus have not been entirely dismantled. The reforms in Mexico
have been cleverly orchestrated by President Salinas de Gortari to
appease the fears of the developed countries of the world .0 By advertising to the industrial, capital rich world that Mexico now offers a
stable investment climate, through such programs as the Maquiladora
programs," it is hoped that private foreign investment will be
spurred." The reforms have been targeted to a circumscribed sector
of the Mexican economy; those focusing on manufacturing, particularly the high-growth, high technology sectors."
While the figures show that investment has indeed increased, the
focus and the benefits of the reforms have not been targeted at the
poor masses of Mexican workers. In fact, it is estimated that the
through deliberate use of force and intimidation, the average real
wages have declined 50% since 1982." It is difficult to envision a
more exploitative scenario, and it is difficult to imagine that the results under the NAFTA, vis a vis the average Mexican citizen, will
be different.' Regardless of the articulated objectives of the agreemen 3 it is hard to escape the feeling that the NAFTA is an attempt
by the governments of both the United States and Mexico to appease
big business.'
For Mexico, the NAFTA represents a way to procure new mar-

United States Trade Representative to drop Mexico in October 1989 from a "Priority Watch List" of violators who are subject to possible sanctions under the "special 301 provision" of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Id.
48. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at vii.
49. See infra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text examining the maquiladora program in
more detail.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Edward Cody, Mexican Ruler Tightens Reign on Labor: Prominent Union Leader Arrested in Midst of Contract Negotiations, WASHINGTON POsT, Feb. 28, 1992, at A28.
54. See infra notes 143-44 for a more detailed discussion of the effects of the NAFTA
on the Mexican people in light of recent history.
55. See The North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
102, _ U.S.T. _ (hereinafter NAFTA). The articulated objectives of the NAFTA as they appear in the latest draft are: (1) to confer "most favored nation status" on the participating
countries; (2) to eliminate barriers to trade between those countries; (3) to enhance fair competition and free trade; (4) to increase investment opportunities in the signatory nations; and
(5) to protect intellectual property rights. Id.
56.

AFL-CIO ExEcuTivE COuNsEL, STATEMENT ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE

AGREEMENT (1993).
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kets for a budding, yet presently exploitative, industrial sector.Y On
the United States side, NAFTA, under the guise of "economic
growth", allows U.S. industry to free itself of increasing labor costs
and worker and environmental protection which they claim have stagnated productivity." The Agreement represents the ultimate bargaining weapon. Industry giants can simply say, 'if you won't concede,
we'll leave and take our jobs elsewhere'.
IV.

EcoNoMIc THEORIES

Supporters of the NAFTA generally rely heavily on economic
theories which are difficult to prove and therefore speculative. This
point of view was summed up neatly by the International Trade
Commisiion ("ITC")." The NAFTA would benefit the United States
economy overall because the Mexican economy is growing rapidly,
and will continue to grow rapidly in the coming years, whether or not
the NAFTA is adopted.' If Mexican growth is forthcoming, Mexico
will become a larger trading partner of the United States and the
increased trade will benefit the United States.6'
Admittedly, the effects will not be uniform on all industries, 2
but the United States economy will benefit on net.63 For instance, it
is suggested that the NAFTA will benefit the United States economy

57. See infra notes 86-91, 117 and accompanying text.
58. See Drusilla K. Brown et al., A North American Free Trade Agreement: Analytical
Issues and a Computational Assessment, 15 THE WoRLD ECoNOMY 11, 12-13 (1992); see
also infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text illustrating the disparity in labor costs; see
also infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text discussing the objection to, and the likely
absence of, environmental regulations and worker safety regulations in the final agreement.
59. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at viii. Proponents of the NAFTA feel that:
[b]y codifying liberal trade and investment policies in an international agreement,
heretofore adopted only as a matter of administrative policy, a United
States-Mexico FTA would increase the confidence of investors in Mexico's economy. An increase in investment in Mexico would raise wage incomes and employment in Mexico, increase GDP growth, increase foreign exchange earnings, and facilitate the transfer of technology. In so doing, it would increase Mexico's demand
for U.S. exports and benefit the United States.
l
60. See id.
61. Id. at viii. The ITC noted in its report that the United States is likely to be the
single largest foreign beneficiary of the resultant growth in the Mexican economy, since it is
Mexico's most significant source of imports and investment capital. Id. In 1989, Mexico
derived over 70% of its imports, and 63% of all accumulated direct foreign investment from
the United States. Id.
62. id.
63. Id. at vii.
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overall by expanding trade opportunities, lowering prices, increasing
competition, and improving the ability of United States firms to exploit economies of scale and compete with other foreign competitors,
especially those in the Pacific Rim.' Since the gains are likely to
outweigh the costs, the United States economy will probably gain on
net.' However, there are likely to be some shifts in production so
that certain U.S. industries will be disproportionately affected by the
NAFTA.6
While at first blush this conclusion seems a plausible one, unfortunately it is fatally flawed. ' The theories upon which this "net"
growth is based assume an economic environment which simply has
not existed in the history of the United States." They rely on fundamentally unsound assumptions: (1) full employment;' 70 and (2) no net
shift in investment from the United States to Mexico.
They assume perfect markets in which supply always equals
demand and everyone who loses a job finds one immediately in another industry, resulting in a benefit to both the United States and
Mexico from the resultant upsurge of United States exports in Mexico."' Even assuming, arguendo, that such an economic environment
could exist, the claimed benefits to the United States economy still
would not materialize, even in theory. As the ITC noted in its report,
the benefits relative to the size of the United States economy are
likely to be small in the near to medium term for two major reasons.7
First, in spite of Mexico's population of some 88 million, its
economy is much smaller than the United States economy and poor
income distribution limits the ability of the average Mexican consumer to buy expensive American products.73 Second, with a few excep-

64. Id.
65. Id
66. Id at viii.
67. See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text discussing the reluctance of Labor to
put its faith in speculative economic theories and its preference to focus on reality.
68. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
69. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 2-4, 2-5; see also Mercado-Llorens, supra note
15, at 7 (citations omitted).
70. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 2-4.
71. See JEFF FAUX & THEA LEE, ECONOMIC POLICY INsmUT, THE EFFECT OF GEORGE
BUSH'S NAFrA ON AMERICAN WORKERS: LADDER UP OR LADDER DOWN? 5 (1992).
72. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 2-2.
73. Id Mexico is the United States' third-largest trading partner, after Canada and Japan,
but it accounted for just 6% of U.S. imports and 7% of U.S. exports in 1989. Id at 1-3. In
contrast, the United States accounted for more than two-thirds of Mexico's exports in 1989.
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tions, both countries already have relatively low tariff and non-tariff

barriers to trade with each other.74 A sizable share of U.S. imports
from Mexico already enters the United States "either free of duty

unconditionally,

under

the

Generalized

System

of Preferences

("GSP"), or at substantially reduced effective rates under
Maquiladora7 production-sharing arrangements."" Similarly, many
United States exports to Mexico are afforded duty-free treatment in

Mexico under the Maquiladora program. 7' For these reasons, the effects for many years will probably be fairly small relative to the size
of the United States economy.' The ITC admitted that benefits to
the United States would likely be nominal under a FTA with Mexico
when it reported that "the more successful FTAs ... tend to be

among countries that are at comparable levels of development [and]
at more advanced levels of development."79' Moreover, long-term predictions based on the Mexican industry as it now exists are misplaced
due to the fact that if the NAFrA succeeds in attracting investment
to Mexico, industry will undergo a transformation from its presently
underdeveloped state to a point where comparisons with the present
day are useless.'
Other proponents rely not on utopian economic models, but rather, take a quasi-Darwinian approach. They claim that regardless of the
economic climate, there are "comparative advantages" which exist by
which certain industries will naturally gravitate to certain countries."'
Mexico, it is claimed, has a comparative advantage in agricultur-

1, Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) of $187 billion in 1989 was only 3.6% of U.S.
GDP. kd at 2-2.
74. See 1d at 2-2. An FTA is most likely to be beneficial if its members have high
trade barriers before integration. Therefore, the strongest effects on U.S. industries would
likely be where current barriers to trade and investment are high or where demand for each
others' products and services is highly sensitive to price. 1d at 2-1.
75. See supra note 11.
76. See Paul Wonacott & Mark Lutz, Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?, in FREE
TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 59-84 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
77. Id
78. See Jeffrey J. Schott, The Mexican Free-Trade Illusion, INT'L ECONOMY, June 1990,
at 32.
79. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 2-1.
80. See infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
81. See generally David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(1817), in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO (Piero Sraffa ed.,
1951). The theory of comparative advantage supposes that each country has advantages relative to others with respect to certain goods and services by nature of factors such as natural
resources or technology, which make that nation a more efficient producer of those goods or
services. Id.
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al goods, low technology and labor intensive manufacturing, while the
United States has a comparative advantage in capital intensive products and high technology.' Therefore, "the theory says that [the
United States] can trade their [capital intensive products] to Mexico,"
and they can trade to the U.S. goods in which they have a comparative advantage and both sides are satisfied.' If the theory is correct,
then the United States should only experience the loss of low-wage,
low-skill jobs to Mexico, while retaining and even increasing highwage, high-skill jobs in order to meet the employment needs of those
However, if the
displaced in the low-wage occupations.'
Maquiladora experiment is any indicator, and we feel it is, then the
comparative advantage theory is without merit. The transfer of capital
and the transfer of capital intensive and high technology industry
which have actually taken place since the inception of the
Maquiladora program is theoretically impossible according to comparative advantage.'
V.

RECENT HISTORY AS A GUIDE

In the opinion of Labor, the Maquiladora program represents but
a small taste of what a full scale FTA with Mexico will mean. So
far, the taste has been bitter indeed.' It is the moving of industry
and capital to Mexico which worries Labor,87 not the lowering of
tariff and non-tariff barriers.' The auto 9 and electronics industries, in which the United States supposedly enjoys a comparative

82. Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 7, 8.
83. See Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 7, 8.
84. id
85. See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text.
86. See IBEW, supra note 21, at 7. Under the maquiladora program "[h]igher-paid and
higher-skilled jobs in the United States are . . . being moved to Mexico. [E]ntire facilities
were shut down. Because of the threat of job losses to maquiladora factories, our members
have repeatedly accepted wage and benefit cuts." 1dL
87. See IBEW, supra note 21, at 9.
88. See supra notes 69-80, 89-98 and accompanying text explaining how these will have
little effect on the U.S. economy.
89. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at xiii ("[t]he auto industry in Mexico is owned by
five foreign producers: The Big Three U.S. automakers, Nissan, and Volkswagen, which assembled 641,000 autos there in 1989."); see also Juanita Darling, U.S. Auto Makers Fret
About Threat Of Mexican Imports, THE L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at DI (Mercedes - Benz
has announced plans to build an automotive assembly plant in Mexico.).
90. "Electronic equipment principally includes (1) television receivers and other consumer
electronic products, (2) electronic components, including semiconductors, television picture
tubes, and articles for making and breaking electrical circuits, such as connectors, relays, and
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advantage9 are illustrative of the mass exodus of U.S. industry and
capital south of the border. The numbers are startling.
United States imports of Mexican autos, from Mexico's small but
rapidly growing auto industry, have increased steadily over recent
years.' "In contrast, U.S. exports to Mexico remain negligible, totaling just 2002 vehicles, valued at $15 million, in 1989."'3 In addition,
trade in auto parts is also expanding rapidly, "with U.S. imports
rising by 14% annually, to $3.6 billion, and U.S. exports advancing
by 16% annually, to $3.4 billion."' The auto parts industry in Mexico comprises several hundred firms, however, the largest are the
U.S.-owned auto parts firns." In 1988 the automotive sector accounted for 27.5% of the imports from Mexico.'
Similar growth in trade between the United States and Mexico
has taken place in the electronics sector as well. Throughout the
1980s, U.S. trade in electronic equipment with Mexico grew rapidly,
"although it was marked by a United States deficit of $1.3 billion on
total trade estimated at $8.1 billion in 1989.""' This despite the fact
that there are presently tariffs levied by both the United States and
Mexico although clearly the Mexican tariffs are more onerous.98
Not surprisingly, most of this trade is concentrated in the

switches, (3) office machines, including computers, and (4) telephone and telegraph apparatus." USITC 2353, supra note 1,at 4-25, n.87.
91. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text explaining the theory of comparative
advantage.
92. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at xiii. U.S. auto imports from Mexico from 1985
through 1989 increased at a rate of 34% annually totalling almost 143,000 units with a value
of $1.3 billion or about 3% of total U.S. auto imports. Id.
93. Id at 4-17.
94. Id at xiii.
95. Id. at 4-17.
96. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations. Phase I:Recent Trade and Investment Reforms
Undertaken By Mexico and Implications for the United States, USITC pub. 2275, Inv. No.
332-282, at 5-14 (Apr. 1990) (hereinafter "Phase I") (Motor vehicles were 16.3%, auto parts
were 5.8% and combustion engines were 5.4%).
97. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-25.
98. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-25. (Estimated by the USITC staff from official
statistics of Mexico's Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development ("SECOFI")).
The nominal U.S. tariff on Mexican electronic products averages 5% ad
valorem, although some duty rates are as high as 15%. The effective
trade-weighted duty averages only 2%, given the large portion of the trade that
enters at reduced duties under the Maquiladora programs. By contrast, Mexico's
imports of electronic products from the United States are subject to average tariffs
estimated at 16% ad valorem.
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Maquiladora sector.' As of August 1989, Maquiladora factories producing electronics goods accounted for 27.8% of all Maquiladora
factories and employed 38.6% of all Maquiladora workers." Almost
all of the significant Maquiladora factories producing electronics were
owned by companies headquartered in the United States. 1 '
The imports from all Maquiladora factories totalled $12.5 billion
in 1989, the majority of which were motor vehicles and electronic or
electrical equipment." Maquiladora imports accounted for 45% of
total U.S. imports from Mexico, up from 29% in 1985.103 Perhaps
most importantly, however, is the fact that according to the data from
the U.S. Department of Commerce, about 50% of the value of U.S.
imports from Mexico under the Maquiladora program were U.S. content. 4 The same data shows that 27% of U.S. exports to Mexico
were items that reentered the United States under the Maquiladora
program and merely represented intercompany transactions.'" 5
If one puts credence in the comparative advantage theory, the
preceding results are not possible. According to the theory, since the
automobile industry is capital intensive, it should remain in the United States.'" Quite the opposite has occurred, however."° According
to one report by the EPI, about three-quarters of the manufacturing
jobs which have moved to Mexico in the period studied, 1986-89,
have been in the electronics and motor vehicle industries, in which
wages are either close to average or well above average."
The same is true of the electronics industry which should provide the United States with a comparative advantage because it is
"high-tech." 1"9 In fact, sixty percent of the output of the
Maquiladora industry at the present time is in high-tech, high skill
99. I
100. Phase I, supra note 96, at 5-14.
101. See id.
102. li; see supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text describing the nature of the auto
and electronics sectors in Mexico.
103. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 1-5.
104.

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, WORKER RIGHTS IN EX-

PORT PROCESSING ZONES: MEXCO, vol. II, 75 (1990).
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text explaining the theory of comparative
advantage.
107. ROBERT A. BLEcKER & WILUAM E. SPRIGGS, MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN
NORTH AMERICA: WHERE THE JOBS HAVE GONE 6 (Economic Policy Institute 1992) (here-

inafter Blecker & Spriggs).
108. Id. at 6.
109. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text explaining the theory of comparative
advantage.
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sectors such as electronics and automotive products."' Clearly the
comparative advantage theory fails to take account of such factors as
cheap labor and lax environmental and worker safety standards."'
Unfortunately, corporations like those employing state of the art robotics and other advanced manufacturing equipment under the
Maquiladora
program today have not failed to recognize these fac2
tors."

It is axiomatic that other similarly situated corporations will
move to Mexico after the NAFTA has been implemented to take
advantage of these factors also."' In fact, one-quarter of the 455
business executives polled recently admitted that they will use the
NAFTA to bargain down wages." 4 Forty percent said that it is likely that they would shift some portion of their production operations
to Mexico as a result of the agreement."'
There is no available data to suggest that as Mexican productivity grows, wages will increase thereby diminishing the comparative
advantage enjoyed by Mexico in the area of labor costs. In fact, such
a likelihood is contradicted by the available data. The EPI has reported that, "[a]lthough Mexican productivity has come closer and closer
in these industries [automobile and electronics] Mexican Wages have
remained far lower. Thus, Mexico has acquired an enormous competitive advantage in unit labor costs (wages relative to productivity)."" 6
Another study found that the workers in a Mexican automobile plant
whose productivity had risen to eighty (80) percent of their United
States counterparts were paid wages reaching only six (6) percent of
their American counterparts." 7

110.

See

GREGORY

K.

SCHOEPFLE,

U.S.-MEXICo

FREE

TRADE

AGREEMENT:

THE

MACQUAZATION OF MExiCO? 4 (1990).
111. See Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 8.
112. See Blecker & Spriggs, supra note 107, at 6. The electronics and automobile industries, in which employment is increasing in Mexico, are ones in which U.S. employment has
been on the decline. id. There already appears to be a shifting of production to Mexico and
away from the United States. /,L
113. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text discussion the effects of the NAFTA
with respect to U.S. job losses.
114. George Anders, Heading South, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at RI.
115. Id
116. See Blecker & Spriggs, supra note 107, at 8.
117.

WALTER R. MEAD, THE LOW-WAGE CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL GROWTH: THE LABOR-

COST PRODUCTIVITY IMBALANCE IN NEWLY INDUsTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (Economic Policy
Institute 1991).
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VI. THE LIKELY IMPACT IS OBVIOUS
A. Job Losses
There simply is no evidence to support the contention by
NAFTA advocates that the agreement will create new high-tech, highwage jobs."' Recent figures released by the Department of Labor
show that over 21 million of the new non-farm jobs which are expected to be created by the year 2005 will be in low wage jobs." 9
Based on current projections, high wage jobs will not materialize
without the NAFTAIs so what is it about the NAFTA which makes
it uniquely able to create these jobs? According to the Institute for
International Economics, the answer is, nothing.'21 The IE report
states that increasing the level of imports to Mexico will not reflexively create new high wage employment in the United States."
The reality is that manufacturing jobs will admittedly be lost as
a result of the NAFrA.'" President Clinton admitted during a campaign speech that "[tihere are apparel workers, fruit and vegetable
farmers, electronic workers, auto workers who are at risk not only of
short-term dislocation, but of permanent damage if this agreement is
not strengthened and improved." 24 Former Secretary of Labor Lynn
Martin admitted last year that 150,000 jobs could be lost as a result
of a NAFTA.'" This "certainly sounded the alarm bells for working
men and women whose jobs are at stake." 26 Even the HE, which

118. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ACTIONS TAKEN IN FULFILLMENT OF THE
MAY 1, 1991 COMMITMENTS (1992) (claiming NAFTA will create new high-paying jobs).
119. See Mercado-Liorens, supra note 15, at 6 (citations omitted).
120. Id
121.

See GARY CLYDE HuFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 21

(Institute for International Economics 1992) (" . . . [Tihere is no overall tendency for U.S.
exports to Mexico to support high-skilled U.S. jobs ... .
122. Id.
123. See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text. A closer examination of the recent
growth of U.S. exports to Mexico reveals that the increase is in raw materials, indicating that
actual production is shifting from the U.S. to Mexico. Memorandum from Leslie Nulty,
UFCW to Jim Jontz, Fair Trade Campaign (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file at the UFCW).
124. See Clinton, supra note 14.
125. Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 4 (citations omitted).
126. The former Secretary's assumption that workers who lose those jobs would somehow
move on to higher-skill, higher paying employment opportunities is unsupported by recent
economic experience. See Mercado-Lorens, supra note 15, at 4; see supra notes 118-122 and
accompanying text.
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supports the trade agreement, has calculated that NAFTA "would . . .
displace 324,000 jobs in the United States, as imports from Mexico
replace products made less efficiently by American factories . . . ""
The long term job gains, upon which the former Bush administration relied heavily, and which were supposed to more than offset
the above referenced job losses, have recently been called into question,' leaving one to wonder, does the United States stand to gain
anything by this agreement? According to the New York Times:
The two most influential academic experts on the North American Free Trade Agreement, whose forecasts of short term job gains
were heavily cited by the Bush Administration at Congressional
hearings and news conferences promoting the pact last year, have
concluded that any net increase in job gains would evaporate after
15 to 20 years.
The two experts, Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, who
are both senior fellows at the Institute for International Economics, ... have not included this conclusion in their new book on the
pact, although they do mention that the short term gains may not be
permanent.'
The factors that have made the Maquiladora program attractive to
U.S. companies during the 1980s, such as duty-free benefits, cheap
labor, an absence of labor rights and lax environmental and worker
safety laws, will also, if adopted as currently written, make the
NAFTA attractive. There are presently no provisions which address
minimum hours and working conditions," ° the rights of Mexican
workers to organize or bargain collectively,"' or worker safety."2
While supporters of the NAFTA claim the benefits of the agreement
will include improved earnings, higher living standards and improved
overall economic and political conditions, the International Trade
Commission found that "[a]Ilmost all U.S. industry representatives
were opposed to the issue of Mexican workers' rights being included

127. Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1993 at D1
[hereinafter "Bradsher"].
128. See id
129. Id.
130. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations. Phase II: Summary of Views on Prospects for
Future United States-Mexico Relations, USITC pub. 2326, Inv. No. 332-282, at 1-12 (Oct.
1990) [hereinafter "Phase H"].
131. Id.
132. Id.
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33
in an FTA."
As far as provisions concerning environmental standards, participants from both the United States and Mexico have voiced their
objections to the inclusion of such provisions in the final draft."
The ITC noted that at its hearings on the proposed FTA, "[p]articipants representing U.S. industry sources with locations in Mexiand the majority of Mexican participants oppose inclusion of
co ...
environmental standards in an FIA, noting that Mexico would probably lose investment if the environmental regulation and corresponding
costs became too high." 35
Even the Article of the NAFTA entitled "Objectives" expressly
emphasizes security of investment over, and to the exclusion of, security of employment. 36 While there is specific mention of the protection of investment and intellectual property rights, 31 there is no
equivalent language guaranteeing labor or environmental standards.'
The omission of such provisions belies the true purpose of the
NAFTA; to guarantee investments, those to whom they flow and the
nature of the production generated thereby. 39 This was precisely the
articulated objective in creating the Maquiladora sector: " to induce
investment and the transfer of technology from developed countries
by creating a more stable investment environment.'4 ' The results,
therefore will be the same. To argue otherwise in the absence of any
factors which will make them different is naive.
Surely, U.S. workers cannot, and should not be forced to, compete with a labor force which lives in "cardboard squatter camps ...
without water, electricity, heat, sewage, or sanitation service". 4 '
Where the factories, such as Maquiladoras, unrestrained by environmental legislation "turn much of the border region into a sinkhole of

133. Id.
134. Id. at 1-11, 1-12.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also supra note 55.
137. Id.
138. i
139. See Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 9,10.
140. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-26 n.91 (relating to Mexico's plan for promoting
investment in advanced technology industries outlined in "The National Program of Industrial
Modernization 1990-1994," published by SECOFI in DIAIO OFIciAL, an official document of
the Mexican Government, Jan. 24, 1990.
141. See supra note 11.
142. Sandy Tolan, The Border Boom; Hope and Heartbreak, N.Y. TImss, July 1, 1990 at
F17; see also Appendix B comparing U.S. manufacturing wages with those of their Mexican
counterparts.
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abysmal living conditions and environmental degradation."'
In addition, the result of capital outflows, by United States based
industry from United States, and relocation to Mexico of capital
which would otherwise have been invested in the United States by
foreign industry, will clearly have adverse results on American workers.'" Whether it is in the loss of jobs, salary and benefit concessions, both, or more. 4
B.

Capital Outflow And Relocation

The potential exists then for the NAFTA to have a significant
impact on major U.S. industries such as the automobile and electronics industries." The problem is that the impact will be negative.
The greatest impact would come from a liberalization of the
above-referenced Mexican barriers to trade and investment.'" The
liberalization of these barriers would likely result in heavier investment, for instance from the Big-Three U.S. auto-makers and foreign
companies such as Honda and Toyota, in the Mexican auto industry' 8 Heavier investment will lead to increased production and to
increased exports of Mexican produced cars abroad, including imports
49
by the United States."
Common sense tells us that such a result would be a realization
of the worst fears of organized labor, specifically the UAW. s Is the
impact on this industry really "difficult to determine" as the bipartisan
report compiled by the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Bipartisan
Committee") claim? 5'

143. Sonia L. Narario, Boom and Despair, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 22, 1989 at 26.
144. See infra notes 146-166 and accompanying text.
145. rd
146. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
147. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-17.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 4-20.
150. See Phase II, supra note 130, at 2-15. The United Auto Workers Union is concerned
about U.S. job losses under an FTA with Mexico. It believes that Mexico's low wages will
be a factor in the cross-border rationalization of North American production. Id
151. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at xiii. The drafters of the Bipartisan Committee
report state that:
[tihe likely impact of an FTA with Mexico on the United States in automotive
products is difficult to determine without knowledge of the Big Three automakers'
plans for their Mexican operations. It is also difficult to assess the impact of an
FTA with Mexico on U.S. trade in automotive products with Canada, given the
highly integrated nature of the Big Three U.S. automakers' operations in the Unit-
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Even the members of the Bipartisan Committee agree that "U.S.
auto industry representatives view Mexico as a long-term, high-growth
market for autos [and] [t]hey also believe that the potential exists for
the Mexican auto industry, with its low labor costs, to become an
integral part of the North American auto industry."12 In fact, the
conclusion reached by the Bipartisan Committee admits matter of
quicken if an FTA
factly that "[t]he pace of integration would likely
15 3
removes Mexico's non tariff barriers" ("NTBs").
Some U.S. industry sources and analysts contend that problems
with transportation, utilities, housing and other infrastructure problems
will hamper auto production in Mexico and deter a mass exodus
"South of the Border.""5 However, conditions are improving and
should not significantly limit future growth in Mexican output. 5 In
fact, the costs associated with an underdeveloped transportation and
social infrastructure appear, even at present, to be more than offset by
at
labor cost savings."' One estimate places labor costs in 5Mexico
7
65 to 75% less than those in the United States or Canada.'
In contrast, removal of United States tariffs on automotive products under an FTA is not expected to have much of an impact on
U.S. exports to Mexico. 5 Removal of these duties would make it
more attractive for Mexican consumers to buy U.S.-made models,
particularly if Mexico's quantitative import limits were lifted as well.
However, as stated earlier, the relatively limited absorptive capacity of
market would tend to limit the volume of U.S. exthe Mexican
15 9
ports.
At present, it is impossible to tell how the NAFTA will affect

ed States and Canada.
Id The rationale for this position is that in a fully integrated North American automotive
products sector it is difficult to determine how much U.S. producers would be able to reduce
their production costs by relocating production to Mexico. Id. at 4-20. Although labor costs
are lower in Mexico, transportation costs would be higher. The less-developed state of the
infrastructure would also tend to increase costs. Moreover, there is obviously a higher overall
risk premium associated with investments in Mexico than in the United States and Canada.
Id at 4-22.
152. Id. at xiii.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4-22.
155. Id.
156. On balance, it is estimated that the Big Three U.S. automakers could increase profit
margins by 4 to 10% by producing in Mexico. (Based on information provided by industry
representatives, October-November 1990). Id.
157. Id.
158. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-21.
159. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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foreign investment in the United States. The uncertainty in this area
is likely to continue until the rules of origin are finalized, implemented and finally interpreted."W As our experience with the United
States-Canada FTA has taught us however, even seemingly acceptable,
straight forward rules of origin, those clearly stating content requirements, are subject to interpretation (manipulation?) and controversy.! For instance, how would foreign companies such as Nissan
and Volkswagen, which have collectively captured more than half the
Mexican auto market, be treated under the NAFrA? Such issues
are not easily resolved, yet their outcome has tremendous consequences for U.S. industry and workers.'63
It is likely that foreign finns, especially those in the Far East
and Europe, will shift some production to Mexico to benefit from the
reduced tariffs on Mexico's exports to the United States, and to overcome the tariff advantage that United States producers would have
over other foreign producers serving the Mexican market. 4 How
much production and capital investment shifts, however, will depend
on how beneficial the rules of origin are to foreign, non-signatory,
companies. 65 However, in light of present trends which show foreign investment increasing in the absence of the NAFTA, the benefits
to be gained by foreign investment in Mexico are only likely to increase once the FTA is in place."

160. A full discussion of the Rules Of Origin as contained within the present draft of the
NAFrA is outside the scope of this paper.
161. See Juanita Darling, U.S. Auto Makers Fret About Threat Of Mexican Imports, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at Dl. The rules of origin of the U.S.-Canada FTA specify that vehicles can enter duty-free provided that 50% of the value of the vehicle comes from the country of origin. However, a dispute arose over how the content was to be determined. Id.
162. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-21.
163. See USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-19. The fear of U.S. industry is that non-signatory nations will funnel their autos through Mexico and thereby enter the U.S. market duty
free. On the other hand, some argue that the application of Mexico's investment restrictions
and performance requirements to Volkswagen and Nissan is an internal Mexican issue. Id,
(Mexico should not be forced, as a result of this bilateral agreement, to make decisions regarding trade with non-signatory nations which would jeopardize its relationship vis-a-vis
those nations).
164. USITc 2353, supra note 1, at 4-20.
165. 1d at 4-21.
166. USITC 2353, supra note 1, at 4-28 n.111. The bipartisan committee noted that:
American Matsushita Electronics Corp. (Panasonic), Troy, OH, in a written submission of Nov. 8, 1990, and a telephone conversation with USITC staff, contends
that an FrA could reduce demand for U.S.-produced mid-sized (19in to 20in)
television tubes. U.S. producers of television sets that incorporate these tubes already assemble a large portion of their production in Mexico in order to take
advantage of Mexico's low labor costs. According to Panasonic, with an FTA,
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VII. ASSISTANCE FOR DISLOCATED WORKERS

The former Bush Administration paid lipservice to worker adjustment programs, an area which is of great concern to Labor.67 The
rhetoric is impressive. Former President Bush states in his response:
"There is a need to assist dislocated workers who may have adjustment difficulties .... [W]e recognize that effective retraining and
adjustment programs facilitate smooth adaptation to ongoing shifts in
technology and industrial competitiveness.""t However, when the
former Bush administration, like the Reagan administration before it,
represents that they are "firmly committed to a worker adjustment
program that is adequately funded and that [workers] . . .will receive
prompt, comprehensive and effective services,"6 we can not help but
be skeptical.
As Robert Wood testified before the United States Trade Representative, "[t]he history of the last twenty years is filled with unkept
promises of adjustment programs for workers who have suffered from
trade agreements."17 The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program
("TAA") has failed miserably in its stated objective to help displaced
workers."' Funding has never been adequate."72
Moreover, both the Reagan and Bush administrations have tried
to use creative technical classifications to deny worker benefits and
have lobbied to eliminate assistance altogether."'
Cutbacks since 1981 have gutted the TAA program during a decade
of unprecedented need, often turning the government's commitment
to workers into an empty promise... The current administration
and its predecessor have repeatedly proposed terminating the TAA
program ... While the Administration has not succeeded in totally
killing the TAA, the program has been scaled back drastically since

Panasonic would possibly shift its production of mid-sized television sets in Chicago, IL, to Mexico, which would reduce its U.S. labor force by about 100 workers.

Id
167.

See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESPONSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO

IssuEs RAISED IN CONNECTION WrrH THE NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 6 (1991).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See IBEW, supra note 21, at 21.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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1980... throughout a decade of massively higher trade deficits
and worker dislocation. In the face of these past practices relative to
adjustment assistance, it is no wonder that American workers are
reluctant to sacrifice their jobs for hollow promises. "4
It is no wonder that the representations that government will at
last adequately represent its workers, are met with skepticism."
VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The concerns of Labor and many Americans is that NAFTA will
serve to lower American standards which are already in force, in the
name of free trade. The provisions pertaining to standards are vague
and make it difficult if not impossible to insure that standards such as
worker safety, environmental, and health standards, are mere floors
rather than ceilings above which no standards may be raised.'76
The question still remains, can the signatories of the NAFTA
unilaterally adopt higher standards such as those already in place
within the United States? The answer is, maybe. For example, the
chapter of the NAFTA dealing with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" is vague with respect to public health standards.'78 It is up
to the interpretation of the dispute resolution body to determine the
acceptable levels of health protection.179
For example, Article 751 entitled "Scope" provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Subchapter, each Party may,
in protecting human, animal or plant life or health, establish its appropriate level of protection in accordance with Article 757..'...
Article 757 provides: "Each party, in establishing its appropriate level
of protection: (a) should take into account the objective of minimizing
negative trade effect ....

.,,

There is obviously a natural tension

between these sections and it is unclear how this tension will be
resolved in practice by the dispute resolution body. Article 757 sug-

174. Hearings on the Operation and Effectiveness of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Sheldon Friedman, Department of Economic Research,

AFL-CIO).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

IBEW, supra note 21, at 22.
NAFrA, supra note 55, Articles 754(2), 757(3)(a).
NAFTA, supra note 55, Ch. 7 Sub. B.
Id.
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
NAFTA, supra note 55, Article 754(2) (emphasis added).
NAFTA, supra note 55, Article 757(3)(a).
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gests that in terms of protection of public health and other standards,
any standards imposed which are higher than those of the other signatories will be deemed violative of the agreement when they are
weighed against the effects on trade."
In effect, foreign governments and United States agencies responsible for international trade policies will now be able to influence
United States regulatory policy and process." The United States has
never had a policy by which public health and related policies could
be influenced revised or even retracted due to resultant adverse trade
consequences. ' "4
Moreover, under Chapter 19, interested Americans, such as labor
unions, are precluded from defending, challenging or intervening in,
an action relating to anti-dumping or countervailing duty provisions.' Entities such as labor unions simply do not have standing
in such proceedings."
Chapter 19 raises serious concern for Americans who value democratic process. The chapter provides for the creation of and grants
power to binational panels which have final review over U.S. courts
with respect to the resolution of many important claims."" These
panels are politically insular and no amount of pressure can be
to bear through the political process for the redress of grievbrought
1
ances. 9
This notion goes against the very structure of our government.
to believe that in order to participate in "free trade," the
refuse
We
United States must sacrifice both its standards and its political autonomy.
IX. CONCLUSION

A pure free trade agreement between the United States and other
nations which rival it in terms of economic and social development
has the greatest potential benefit for all parties, 89 provided the prop-

182. Id.; see also Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 17.
183. Mercado-Llorens, supra note 15, at 18.
184. Id.
185. See generally NAFTA, supra note 55, Ch. 19 (stating that a "party," referring to a
party to the treaty, may challenge or seek a determination on a anti-dumping or countervailing duty provision).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss2/1

24

Cunningham and Mercado-LIorens: The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industr
NAFTA: The Sale of U.S. Industry

19931

er ground work is laid. Clearly, Mexico is not a rival of the United
States economically or socially'" and, therefore, an agreement with
Mexico, without certain protections, would be premature. 9
The only plausible impetus for an FTA with this partner at this
time is to benefit corporate management in both the United States and
Mexico. While benefitting corporate management is not harmful per
Se, an agreement which benefits only corporate management, to the
detriment of other sectors of the American economy, is wholly unacceptable."
"Fast track" status was approved by Congress mainly because the
Mexican government promised that "Mexico would not become a
refuge for companies that pollute and disregard workers' rights."""
However, within days after fast track status was granted, Mexican
workers were denied their right to choose a union representative."9
The point of this example is to emphasize the need for preliminary
measures to be taken to assure true "fair" trade between Mexico and
the United States. The advantage enjoyed by Mexican producers is
not based on the superior quality of the product or technological advances in the production process.' Rather, it is based solely on the
ability of Mexican producers to exploit its labor force to a degree
which is illegal in the United States.06
If the environmental and labor standards of Mexico are not
raised so as to be competitive with those in the United States then
this is not "free trade" but merely the exploitation of the underdeveloped state of a third-world nation." Large profits are sure to be
made by the corporate powers within each nation, but little of this
benefit is going to "trickle down" to the worker who produces the
9
goods.
There must be some protection afforded, within the agreement
itself, to the environment and worker's rights in particular so that
those gains which were hard fought and won by the American people
over the last century are not undermined and circumvented in the
name of free trade.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
See supra notes
See supra notes
Andrew Reding,
Id.
See supra notes
Id.
Id.
Id.

49-52 and accompanying text.
139-145 and accompanying text.
Free Trade, Shackled Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1992, at 17.
113-117 and accompanying text.
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X. RECOMMENDATIONS
Organized Labor is and always has been in favor of free trade
on an international level.'" Equally, Labor has always supported
international efforts to raise the living standards and working conditions of workers in underdeveloped countries.'
The present draft of NAFTA needs to be amended in significant
ways in order to achieve either or both of these objectives. First, the
final draft must address the very real problems of job loss and capital
outflows experienced under the Maquiladora program."0 ' Second, a
concrete program to help workers dislocated as a result of the
NAFTA must be included within the draft.' Third, in the area of
environmental, labor and worker safety standards, there must be provisions which guarantee that efforts to raise these standards are not
viewed as, and eliminated as, barriers to free trade. °3 Finally, Labor
is loathe to accept a dispute resolution apparatus which removes
almost all final decision making from the arena of the democratic
process which all American citizens value; which we feel is not a
consideration to be bargained away as an American quid for a Mexican quo.'
These considerations must be addressed in the final draft of the
NAFTA. The magnitude of the agreement, and the historic failures of
previous administrations to make good on promises to address concerns at a later date, lead to the conclusion that it is both impossible
and unlikely that curative measures can be successfully implemented
post-hoc.

199. See e.g., IBEW, supra note 21, at 2.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 118-166 and accompanying
202. See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying
203. See supra notes 176-184 and accompanying
204. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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APPENDIX

A

IBEW LossEs TO MEXICO
Approx.
IBEW Job
Losses

Years

175

1991

lighting fixtures

up to 300

1984-1985

portable battery

Local 116
(Forth Worth, TX)
General Dynamics Corp. (IBEW
only had maintenance workers,
entire division was moved to Mexico, including 320 jobs represented
by TAM)

Not
Reported

1990-1991

aircraft wiring harness

Local 134
(Chicago, IL)
Crouse-Hinds, subsidiary of Cooper
Industries, Inc.

90

1985

outdoor lighting equipment

Halo Lighting, subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc.

120

19901991

lighting fixtures

250

1989-

Local Company

Local 42
(Hartford, CT)
Lightolier/Norwich, subsidiary of
Gentlyte, Inc.
Local 110
(St. Paul, MN)
Saft America

BRK Electronics, subsidiary of
Pittway
Local 201
(Beaver, PA)
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Local 325
(Binghamton, NY)
Genreal Electric Co.
Local 387
(Phoenix, AZ)
U.S. Motors, subsidiary of
Emerson Electric Co.

Product

smoke detectors

1990
30

1987

safety switches

Not
Reported

1980s

circuit boards & wiring

270

1986-1987
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Local 558
(Sheffield, AL)
Ford Motor Co.

20

1982

transmissions

Reynolds Metals Co.

50

1986

aluminum

Local 583
(El Paso, TX)
Hatch Manufacturing

20

1987

switchgear

Local 613
(Atlanta, GA)
General Electric Co.

38

1987

coils for motors

Exide Battery, subsidiary of Exide.
Inc.

75

1988

auto & marine batteries

Local 716
(Houston, TX)
General Electric Co.

14

1984

coils

Not
Reported

1980s

power dist. parts

Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Not
Reported

1980s

Local 1031
(Chicago, IL)
Genlyte/Elgin. subsidiary of
Gentyle Group, Inc.

90

1990

Advance Transformer Co., subsidiary of Philips Industries, N.V.

300

1989-1990

Lightolier/Fox/ Valley, subsidiary
of Gentyle Group, Inc.

150

1990

ballasts and other components

Local 1040
(Hartford, CT)
Cooper-Arrow Hart/Danielson,
subsidiary of Cooper Industries.
Inc.

200

1986

electric components and
switches

General Electric Co.

power dist. parts
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Local 1048
(Indianapolis. IN)
Thomson Consumer Electronics,
Inc.

Over 2000

1980-1988

television components

Local 1109
(Goshen. IN)
Johnson Controls, Inc.

300

1984-1991

electrical controls

Local 1167
(Bellefontaine, OH)
Westinghouse Electric Corp.

400

1986

electric motors

Local 1169
(Milwaukee, WI)
Square D Co.

1991

electrical controls

Local 1203
(Pawtucket, RI)
American Insulated Wire Corp.

1985

cord sets

Local 1274
(Warwick, RI)
Leviton Manufacturing Co.

800

Local 1377
(Cleveland. OH)
Ford Motor Co.
Oftlighting, subsidiary of Genlyte
Group, Inc.

Local 1453
(Springfield, MO)
Zenith Electronics Corp.
Local 1470
(Kearny, NJ)
American Telephone & Telegraph

wiring devices

1985-1989

castings, engines

100

Local 1386
(Newburyport, MA)
Gould, Inc., subsidiary of Nippon
Mining Co., Ltd.
Local 1422
(Bloomington, IN)
Thomson Consumer Electronics,
Inc.

1988-1991

1991

lights

1982-1991

fuses

180

1991
planned

20-inch color TVs

2,900

TV receivers, chassis.
and cabinets

130

1970s1980s
1990

up to 5,000

1985

telephone manufacturing

Co.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
442

Hofsrra Labor Law Journal

Local 1499
(Chelsea. MA)
Lightolier/Fr. subsidiary of Genlyte
Group. Inc.

1990

[Vol. 10:2

light fixtures

Local 1501
(Batmore. MD)
American Totalisator Co., subsidiary of General Instruments Corp.

60

1975-1991

electric components

Local 1516
(Jonesboro, AK)
Universal Manufacturing, subsidiary of MagneTek, Inc.

600

1988-1989

Electric Ballasts

ADT Security Systems, subsidiary
of ADT, Inc.

400

1989-1991

Electronic

Several
hundred

1984-1990

ceramic capacitors

430

1989-1991

jig, wire, and fixture
assmeblies

Local 1591
(Conway, SC)
AVX Ceramic, subsidiary of
Kyocera Corp.
Local 1623
(Zanesville, OH)
United Technologies Automotive
Plant, subsidiary of United Technologies, Corp.
Local 1627
(Lexington, KY)
Lexington Lamp Plant, subsidiary
of General Electric Co.
Local 1643
(Upper Sandusky, OH)
A.O. Smith Corp.

Local 1690
(Olean, NY)
AVX Corp., subsidiary of Kyocera
Corp.

1990

180

1981-1985

lamp mounts

electric motors

1988
100

1990

200

1991
planned

200

1985-1991

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss2/1

ceramic capacitors

30

Cunningham and Mercado-LIorens: The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industr
19931

NAFTA: The Sale of U.S. Industry

Local 1691
(Bellefontaine, OH)
Siemens Energy & Automation,
subsidiary of Siemens, A.G.
Local 1710
(Los Angeles, CA)
Halo Lighting, subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc.

Not
Reported

1987

arc grids for electric
breakers

100

1988

lighting fixtures

Wagner Electric, subsidiary of
Cooper Industries, Inc.

break shoes
1991
1988

Local 1740
(Urbana. OH)
Siemens Energy & Automation,
subsidiary of Siemens, A.G.

breakers and switchgear

lighting parts

Local 1794
(Paris, TX)
Philips Lighting, subsidiary of
Philips Industries, N.V.

10

1987-1990

Local 1805
(Baltimore, MD)
Westinghouse Electric Corp.

50

1991
planned

Local 1942
(Montgomery, IL)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.

Not
Reported

1980s

telecommunications
components

Local 1969
(Redwood City, CA)
GTE Lenkurt, subsidiary of GTE
Corp.

500

1984

coil transformers

Local 1973
(Lewiston, ME)
Arrow Hart, subsidiary of Cooper
Industries, Inc.

10

1980

electric switches, outlets, and other components

Local 1974
(Omaha, NB)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Technologies, subsidiary of American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

60

1989-1990

wired connector blocks
and assemblies
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Local 1977
(Tipp City. OH)
A.O. Smith Corp.

pre-1985

[V'ol. 10:2

electric motors

1985

Local 1985
(North Canton. OH)
Hoover, subsidiary of Maytag
Corp.

floor care machines

Local 2005
(Philadelphia, PA)
Progress Lighting Co., subsidiary
of Hanson, PLC

120

1988-1991

Local 2015
(Danbury, CN)
Amphenol Products. subsidiary of
LPL Technologies, Inc.

90

1990

Local 2021
(Oklahoma City, OK)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.

400

1989-1990

Local 2022
(Little Rock, AK)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.

300

1988

170

1989

Not
Reported

1980-1982

computer parts

50

1989-1991

batteries

300

1982

motors

400

1991

50

mid-1980s

Local 2047
(St. Paul, MN)
Unysis Corp.
Local 2064
(Valdosta, GA)
Saft America, Inc.
Local 2101
(Watertown, NY)
Northland, subsidiary Scott &
Fetzer Co.
Local 2112
(Albuquerque, NM)
GTE Lenkurt, subsidiary of GTE
Corp.
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1985

semiconductors

600

1989-1991

lighting ballasts

Local 2220
(Lexington, KY)
Square D Co.

Not
Reported

1990

Local 2245
(Earlysville, VA)
Cooper Industries, Inc.

100
(more
planned)

1990-1991

circuit breakers

390

pre-1985

electric motors

400+

1985-1988

Local 2262
(Jackson, MI)
National Presto Industries. Inc.

400

1976

Local 2287
(Oxford, OH)
Square D Co.

440

1989-1990

Local 2125
(Santa Ana, CA)
Pockwell International Corp.
Local 2156
(Gainsville, FL)
Universal Manufacturing, subsidiary of Magnetek, Inc.

Local 2246
(Mt. Sterling, KY)
A.O. Smith Corp.

Local 2371
(Roseville, CA)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.

appliances

electric breakers

1985

cables

60

1991

circuit breakers

Not
Reported

1990-1991

Local 2300
(Northglenn, CO)
American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.
Local 2336
(Milwaukee, WI)
Square D Co.

switch boxes
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APPENDIX B
CHART 1

Facts You Should Know About
U.S. Processed Food Industries and
The Potential Impact of a U.S.-Mexico FTA
U.S. vs MEXICAN HOURLY WAGES
Food Production Workers
$12

S4

U.S. wage

$10o

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Souroe: Bureau of Labor Statlatloa
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS
U.S. MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION WORKERS
MAY 1991
Rank

Industry

Avg. Hourly Wage

1

Tobacco Products

S18.01

2

Petroleum

S16.89

3

Transportation Equipment

$14.74

4

Chemicals

S14.01

5

Primary Metals

S13.22

6

Paper and Allied Products

S12.63

7

Machinery and Equipment

S12.11

8

Instruments

S11.67

9

Printing and Publishing

S11.39

10

Stone. Clay and Glass

S11.34

11

Fabricated Metals

S11.15

12

Electronic Equipment

S10.66

13

Rubber

S10.08

14

Food and Kindred Products

$9.93

15

Lumber and Wood

S9.23

16

Miscellaneous Manufaturing

S8.85

17

Furniture and Fixtures

S8.67

18

Textile Mill Products

$8.22

19

Leather Products

$7.15

20

Apparel

S6.73

AVERAGE MANUFACTURING HOURLY WAGE RATE --

$11.33

Source: U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation: July
1991, Table B-3, (1991).
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